How Secure?

According to an internal security school of thought, India has had a relatively terror-free year in 2009 due mainly to the overt and covert measures taken by the government in the aftermath of the 26/11 attack. The other school of thought believes that since there is tremendous pressure on Pakistan to dismantle the terror infrastructure in its territory and US aid to that country has been linked with its action against terror groups of all hues, Pakistan-based terror leaders too are under pressure from agencies like the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to desist from launching assaults against India temporarily — until things get ‘normal’ when terror blueprints could again be tested. The truth lies somewhere between the two lines of thinking. It is not because of the government’s counter-terror alacrity alone that terror attacks by jihadi groups have been averted this year, nor is it solely because of international pressure on Pakistan that avowedly anti-India terror outfits like the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) are lying low. It is a combination of both. And credit must go to Union Home Minister P Chidambaram for having effected a meaningful shift — after a series of tragedies — in the Home policy. A man known for quality homework and meticulous planning, Chidambaram has ensured that the Home policy formulation is not crippled by obfuscation and lack of direction. In the wake of the 26/11 carnage, he took the initiative of establishing four National Security Guard (NSG) hubs at Hyderabad, Kolkata, Mumbai and Chennai — each with an operational  strength of around 250 personnel. Given the fact that the government has also floated a federal counter-terror wing called the National Investigation Agency (NIA) on the lines of the US’ Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and that the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC), whose job it is to collect intelligence in real time, has been made fully operational, the country’s anti-terror grid has doubtless evolved.

Yet, the question remains: Can a repeat of 26/11 be precluded? In view of the trips of US-based LeT operative David Headley to India after the attack on Mumbai and his successful mission of gathering information on the targets that his Pakistan-based handlers had asked him to study and draw suitable inferences, the loopholes in the country’s intelligence regime have become only too glaring. Had it not been for the FBI that arrested Headley and his accomplice Tahawwur Rana, who have been accused of plotting terror attacks against India and Denmark, the duo might well have frequented India far too often and helped the LeT engineer a fresh jihad mechanism. The point is simple: Indian agencies could not detect them. This apart, there are still serious aberrations in coastal security, police system and intelligence machinery. The Intelligence  Bureau (IB) continues to suffer from manpower inadequacy, with a mere fifth of its total strength being used to gather hard intelligence, while the police forces across the country are as debilitated as the Mumbai Police was on that fateful day, thanks to a gamut of drawbacks ranging from lack of training to technology handicap to unprofessional personnel management. The police-population ratio continues to be far below the UN-stipulated figure. All of this means the task for Chidambaram is still so onerous. THE SENTINEL