Nuclear deal: was it really necessary?

— Dr MM Kapur Any deal done requires all the parties to have a stake and a hand to play with. The Indo-US nuclear deal is one such case. The deal, which has nuclear spinoffs and consequences, has the common man as a major stakeholder, who is entitled to consultation. His views should have found favour of expression in the final agreement.

I feel in this case the common man is on a journey on a train, the destination of which is being decided by those travelling in Upper/AC Class. The “powers that be” have not considered it necessary to outline and debate this new agenda implicit in the nuclear deal with the common man. Considering that it is his and his children’s fate that is at risk, this oversight can have recurring negative outcomes in the future.

Let us have a look at the investment climate. I learn from reports that Dalberg, an economic advising firm to the IMF and the World Bank has analysed the economic investment potential of nuclear power in India for the next 20 years and has found it less valuable than other alternatives!

The US vendors’ interest would be aided if India caps the third-party liability to protect the US firms from being sued in case of accidents, terrorist acts and acts of sabotage against nuclear plants. It seems the US firms have a right to protect their interests. However, the common man’s interests have no such right of protection.

Looking back, the Parliament debate regrettably lacked depth and the views expressed were horrendously along party lines. The manner of voting left much to be desired and thus failed to convince the common man. In fact, it was imperative to have a longer debate and in fact, there should have been a peoples’ vote giving consent. The nation should have been taken into confidence if this treaty is to succeed and many other Singurs to be avoided.

Additionally, there is the question of fears, regarding, the use of nuclear power and its unwanted outcome. These would be unjustified if we were not already subject to: air, water and food contamination; insecure borders; illegal immigrants; terrorist acts ongoing with near nil convictions; acts of sabotage (economic and other assets) with few convictions, spreading naxalism and nonfunctioning public health and care system.

All the above issues clearly point towards poor governance. The common man needs assurance that better governance will resume and his participation in these decisions will be obligatory, so that he can not only weigh the advantages against the drawbacks but that he be an informed stake holder.

At the end of it all, we arrive at the view that the risk-factor involved is a major drawback if we were to adopt the nuclear agenda. Days later, the terrorists had struck Delhi and its markets. Five separate explosions among teeming shoppers resulted over a score dead and hundreds injured.

The security environment for civilian nuclear energy does not seem encouraging right now or in the near future. It is entirely possible that the “powers that be” can convert their strong resolve to adopt the nuclear agenda to an equal resolve to create a systemic change and improve the security environment to encourage investments and indeed, assure security for the common man.

A debate suggested on above lines will also provide space to discuss the merits of renewable energy alternatives. We, in India are blessed with abundant sunlight. A plan of rooftop installation of photovoltaic solar cells certainly needs consideration on a national scale. A subsidy for research and commercial application would meet the emerging demand.

This onsite production will save on cost of transmission and other losses. The excess energy can be fed into the national grid (pay back to the onsite producer). I am told that wind power already exceeds nuclear power generation. All this can be achieved at 0 carbon cost and no added risk to the common man’s already long list of risks.

The avenue suggested above also elevates our self-reliance and aids our negotiating stance in deals with nuclear powers/agencies. Further, this adds value to the investment potential and confidence level of the common man.

A closer look at the terms of the deal show that India requires to sign an additional Protocol, which will allow a more intrusive IAEA inspection of civilian facilities. In the perception of countries inside and outside the NPT, this protocol brings us closer to the NPT regime. And, even though India has always resisted signing the NPT and has stood for a universal NPT, the present deal blunts this stand.

India also agrees to refrain from further testing (self-imposed moratorium). This self-proclaimed constraint was installed in 1998 by the then Union government within the security environment of that period. The reiteration of this moratorium has recurred afresh in 2008 to obtain the NSG waiver–a fresh commitment in the context perceptions of today and possible scenarios of the foreseeable future.

This commitment is also multi-lateral as it was a commitment to NSG Governments and the commitment of a no-first use renders our deterrence pacific. These commitments cannot but impact the perceptions and policies of our nuclear neighbours. We have to be cautious and keep a lookout on how the future unfolds for us. While the two parties work out the practical contours of the deal, the common man will continue to ponder: Did we need the deal? sourcE: assam tribune

Civilian Nuclear Deal: A Victim of Oversell

Civilian Nuclear Deal:

A Victim of Oversell Sreeram Sundar Chaulia With scant light at the end of the tunnel for the India-US civilian nuclear deal, it is evident that the agreement is a victim of oversell as a ‘‘historic’’ accord to emancipate India’s economy and international status. The Manmohan Singh government’s claims in favour of the 123 Agreement were so bombastic as to project it as an elixir that could transform India’s destiny. After inflating the benefits of the deal, the Prime Minister is now facing the music.The centrepiece argument made by the Indian government on behalf of the nuclear deal is that it would usher in a bright new era of nuclear power generation and motor India’s economic growth. The factual basis of this assertion is dubious. Nuclear power currently contributes to barely three per cent of India’s overall energy production and is expected to reach nine per cent only by 2016, provided deals with Washington and the rest of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) go through.The accretion to India’s energy security from importing nuclear fuel and technology, taking costs of procurement into consideration, will thus be only marginal. By painting a much rosier picture, the Indian government raised the antlers of its detractors who did everything to prevent the ruling party from getting plaudits for revolutionizing India’s economic development.In competitive electoral politics, no ruling party will obtain cooperation from the opposition for a deal that the former wants to advertise as its unique achievement. This is, in essence, the reason why the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) opposes the civil nuclear agreement — to obstruct its rival from taking credit. Such thinking is revealed through comments of BJP leaders that they are interested in renegotiating the deal if they come to power.On the question of the deal being an impediment to nuclear weapons testing by India, a concern the BJP shares with some national security elites, the Manmohan Singh government is again guilty of exaggerating the leverage India enjoys. Strategic experts who have pored over the contents of the 123 Agreement and the Hyde Act have drawn valid conclusions that the US is most likely to terminate the agreement if India breaks its moratorium on bomb tests.The Congress party responded with non-transparent assurances that there is no link between capping India’s quest for a credible minimum deterrent and the deal. A more sensible strategy should have been to argue, in private, in a ‘‘so what’’ vein. So what if the US and the NSG turn off their taps for nuclear fuel and technology when India is strategically compelled to conduct more bomb tests?Supposing Chinese and Pakistani nuclear brinkmanship forced India to test more weapons in 2010 or 2013, the ensuing probable loss of civilian nuclear fuel from the US and the NSG would not dent the Indian economy. To reiterate, the addition to India’s energy security from the deal is marginal, not substantial. India’s citizens and industrial entrepreneurs have made enormous sacrifices for the security of the country in the past, and they would certainly not gainsay future nuclear tests by harping on forfeiture of a few thousand megawatts of electricity.Moreover, India’s current nuclear power plants are running at approximately half capacity due to acute shortage of uranium. Whatever fuel and technology India would have received in the short to medium term from the US and the NSG would be utilized to first make the existing nuclear power plants fully operational. There should be no fear of sunk costs in expensive overheads for new nuclear power plants that would have gone down the drain if the US and the NSG withdrew their supplies.A corollary case could have been made that opportunistically receiving nuclear fuel and technology from the US and the NSG for a few years would bring marginal advantages to the country’s indigenous fast breeder reactor programme based on domestically available thorium. Stalwarts of the atomic science establishment, MR Srinivasan and APJ Abdul Kalam, declare that ‘‘an adequate programme of first generation nuclear reactors using natural or enriched uranium is an inescapable technological necessity to launch a substantial programme of thorium utilisation’’.Even a temporary agreement with the US and the NSG could have propelled India’s thorium-based nuclear research forward to a point that withdrawal of nuclear fuel in the future would have minimal impact on the scientific community’s research. Unfortunately, by elevating the economic upside of the deal to sky high proportions, the Manmohan Singh government could not resort to this simple scenario planning.(The writer is a researcher on international affairs at the Maxwell School of Citizenship in Syracuse, New York) (IANS) Source: sentinel assam editorial

PM wants to quit over nuclear deal

PM wants to quit over nuclear deal
Sheela Bhatt

June 19, 2008 23:42 ISTLast Updated: June 20, 2008 00:03 ISTCongress sources told rediff.com late on Thursday night that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is putting the maximum pressure possible on Congress party president Sonia Gandhi to go ahead with the India-US nuclear deal.

The tussle between Dr Singh and some party leaders, who do not want an early general election provoked by the withdrawal of Left support, is on and far from over, the Congress sources added.

Dr Singh would like to resign as prime minister if the Congress party does not back him on the deal. However, negotiations between Dr Singh and the party continue and the final verdict is not out yet.

The prime minister is likely to continue pressurising the Congress leadership before the next United Progressive Alliance-Left parties meeting on the nuclear deal on June 25.

Dr Singh will not have much to lose if he insists on an exit from power because his four-year tenure has ensured his place in history. The final year in power will be the most difficult with international oil prices likely to cross $150 per barrel.

Another factor behind the current political drama in New Delhi over the nuclear deal is a powerful lobby's belief that a strategic partnership with the United States is a win-win situation for India and the US. Dr Singh's supporters think it is time "the Congress calls the bluff of the Left parties" and goes ahead with the nuclear deal.
But it seems difficult for Dr Singh to garner his own party's support for the deal. Notwithstanding the public stand of UPA allies like Rashtriya Janata Dal leader Lalu Prasad, Nationalist Congress President Sharad Pawar [Images] and Dravida Munnetra Kazagham supremo M Karunanidhi supporting the deal, the Congress is well aware that these allies do not want an early election, and certainly not in November. External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee, the mediator between the Congress, the Left parties and its allies, briefed Dr Singh on the issue today.
Dr Singh cancelled all his appointments for Thursday, June 19. An official statement said the prime minister is unwell and running a viral fever.

The prime minister is understandably anguished because it will be embarrassing for him to travel to Tokyo next month for the G-8 summit -- where he will meet US President George W Bush -- after suffering a domestic political defeat on a diplomatic issue of great importance. "The prime minister," a reliable Congress source said, "wants to save his prestige in an international forum." Source: http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/jun/19pm.htm