Shibdas Bhattacharjee
Just before the declaration of election schedule it was expected that the Congress would prefer to go alone in a dozen States where its fight is directly with either the BJP or the regional parties. At that time Uttar Pradesh fell in the “yet to decide” category. This is because the Samajwadi Party unilaterally announced its candidates in over 50 seats at a time when the Congress was awaiting the SP’s response to its list of seats. But the leadership of the Congress could not even imagine that the party will have to jump alone into the fray in Bihar. In fact, Bihar developments have been a shock to the Congress. For the past decade, the party saw Lalu Yadav’s RJD as its most steadfast ally.
For broader historical reasons, the Congress has been eclipsed in the Hindi-heartland — the States of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh — for the better part of a quarter century. But it is true that the Congress came to power at the Centre in 2004 without getting revived in Uttar Pradesh. It could do so because of consolidating anti-NDA parties and strategic alliances with regional players. But the party appears to have been divided on whether or not to get the SP on board in the coming elections. Congress managers’ effort of keeping both the SP and BSP in good humour proved costly for 10 Janpath. After Bihar, the UPA alliance in Jharkhand saw a virtual collapse with the RJD walking out of the JMM-Congress tie-up and both the JMM and the Congress fielding candidates from the same seat.
The coming together of three constituents of the UPA — RJD, LJP and SP — makes it clear that as a pressure group they are striving to strike a hard bargain with the Congress after the elections to the Lok Sabha. Although their so-called ‘alliance’ spans 134 seats in Bihar, UP and Uttarakhand, the RJD and the LJP have no presence in UP while SP is virtually absent in Bihar. Consequently, they would not be treading on each other’s paths. What this alliance signifies, however, is that their position vis-à-vis the Congress has hardened after the failure of their seat-sharing talks with that party’s bosses. For the Congress, the alliance is a setback but not one of which it need be unduly alarmed. It only reaffirms that the Congress can no longer depend on crutches to win seats in UP and Bihar. The changing stance of its erstwhile allies is, however, a psychological setback for the Congress that could earlier boast of a strong grouping behind it. The blow in the north has come at a time when the PMK has deserted the Congress and the fledgling party of Vijay Kanth in Tamil Nadu has decided not to forge an alliance with it. Cumulatively, all this spells trouble for the Congress in an election in which the single largest party could have a clear advantage in forming a workable coalition.
In fact, not only in Bihar, UP and Jharkhand, but in the entire Hindi heartland including Madhya Pradesh, Chhattishgarh, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand too, the Congress is either bereft of poll partner this time or facing tough challenge from the main opposition party. This region has 183 Lok Sabha seats out of which the Congress could manage to win only 29 seats in the 2004 general election. It is clear that the Congress has lost its support base in this region during the last two decades.
In UP last time, the party could register victory in nine seats including Amethi and Rai Bareli, the traditional stronghold of the party. The other seven constituencies are Shajahanpur, Bansgaon (SC), Varanashi (SC), Kanpur, Mathura, Aligarh and Hapur. In Bihar, the party had a pre-poll understanding with the RJD that actually helped it to win in Madhubani, Sasaram and Aurangabad. Though the party did a lot better in the neighbouring Jharkhand where it won in Godda, Dhanbad, Ranchi, Singbhum, Kunti (ST) and Lohardaga, but that was mainly because the Congress-JMM alliance had clicked. But in case of Chhattishgarh, MP and Uttarakhand where there was straight battle between the BJP and Congress, the performance of the latter was again utterly disappointing.
As far as the strategy of the Congress leadership is concerned, there are some contradictory viewpoints. It is said that the new generation leadership of the party led by Rahul Gandhi wants that the party should make an effort to regain the lost ground in the Hindi heartland region, as despite winning some seats in this region in 2004, the party’s vote share compared to the 1999 general election registered a sharp decline. Thus a section of party leadership believes that if coalition politics is taken for granted for the survival of the party in this crucial region for an indefinite time, the party has no future. Then it is something like a calculated risk taken by the Congress leadership to make its presence felt so that it can emerge as a formidable force in the Assembly elections in Bihar, UP and Jharkhand to form a non-BJP or non-BSP government. In fact, in the absence of any major emotive issue in UP, opposition parties in the State are mainly targeting the functioning of the ruling BSP government besides leaning on their respective caste equations to lure the voters. While the Congress tom-toms the performance of the UPA, it also wants to take the Mayawati government to task on law and order and rampant corruption. Undeterred by the criticism, the ruling BSP is circulating booklets to highlight its achievements and its broad-based strategy for the sarva samaj. The BSP plans to repeat its successful “social engineering” formula. But this may have some relevance in UP, but in case of Bihar and Jharkhand it will not be effective although in other States like MP, Chhattishgarh, HP and Uttarakhand, the Congress will have to fight on its own.
But in an election in which alliances are going to play a major role in determining the complexion of the next government, the decision of the leadership of 10 Janpath to go alone into the crucial battle of ballots in the Hindi-heartland does not seem realistic. In fact the electorate in this region has remained so divided on the lines of caste, religion and region during the last two decades that it has virtually made the Congress policy irrelevant. The prime cause of decline in the support base of the Congress Party in this region is that the leadership in New Delhi has failed to read the transitional phase of politics and the changing social order that has given birth to caste-based politics. It will be interesting to see how the party faces the acid test this time.
(The writer is a freelancer based in Halakura, Dhubri) THE SENTINEL
Just before the declaration of election schedule it was expected that the Congress would prefer to go alone in a dozen States where its fight is directly with either the BJP or the regional parties. At that time Uttar Pradesh fell in the “yet to decide” category. This is because the Samajwadi Party unilaterally announced its candidates in over 50 seats at a time when the Congress was awaiting the SP’s response to its list of seats. But the leadership of the Congress could not even imagine that the party will have to jump alone into the fray in Bihar. In fact, Bihar developments have been a shock to the Congress. For the past decade, the party saw Lalu Yadav’s RJD as its most steadfast ally.
For broader historical reasons, the Congress has been eclipsed in the Hindi-heartland — the States of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh — for the better part of a quarter century. But it is true that the Congress came to power at the Centre in 2004 without getting revived in Uttar Pradesh. It could do so because of consolidating anti-NDA parties and strategic alliances with regional players. But the party appears to have been divided on whether or not to get the SP on board in the coming elections. Congress managers’ effort of keeping both the SP and BSP in good humour proved costly for 10 Janpath. After Bihar, the UPA alliance in Jharkhand saw a virtual collapse with the RJD walking out of the JMM-Congress tie-up and both the JMM and the Congress fielding candidates from the same seat.
The coming together of three constituents of the UPA — RJD, LJP and SP — makes it clear that as a pressure group they are striving to strike a hard bargain with the Congress after the elections to the Lok Sabha. Although their so-called ‘alliance’ spans 134 seats in Bihar, UP and Uttarakhand, the RJD and the LJP have no presence in UP while SP is virtually absent in Bihar. Consequently, they would not be treading on each other’s paths. What this alliance signifies, however, is that their position vis-à-vis the Congress has hardened after the failure of their seat-sharing talks with that party’s bosses. For the Congress, the alliance is a setback but not one of which it need be unduly alarmed. It only reaffirms that the Congress can no longer depend on crutches to win seats in UP and Bihar. The changing stance of its erstwhile allies is, however, a psychological setback for the Congress that could earlier boast of a strong grouping behind it. The blow in the north has come at a time when the PMK has deserted the Congress and the fledgling party of Vijay Kanth in Tamil Nadu has decided not to forge an alliance with it. Cumulatively, all this spells trouble for the Congress in an election in which the single largest party could have a clear advantage in forming a workable coalition.
In fact, not only in Bihar, UP and Jharkhand, but in the entire Hindi heartland including Madhya Pradesh, Chhattishgarh, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand too, the Congress is either bereft of poll partner this time or facing tough challenge from the main opposition party. This region has 183 Lok Sabha seats out of which the Congress could manage to win only 29 seats in the 2004 general election. It is clear that the Congress has lost its support base in this region during the last two decades.
In UP last time, the party could register victory in nine seats including Amethi and Rai Bareli, the traditional stronghold of the party. The other seven constituencies are Shajahanpur, Bansgaon (SC), Varanashi (SC), Kanpur, Mathura, Aligarh and Hapur. In Bihar, the party had a pre-poll understanding with the RJD that actually helped it to win in Madhubani, Sasaram and Aurangabad. Though the party did a lot better in the neighbouring Jharkhand where it won in Godda, Dhanbad, Ranchi, Singbhum, Kunti (ST) and Lohardaga, but that was mainly because the Congress-JMM alliance had clicked. But in case of Chhattishgarh, MP and Uttarakhand where there was straight battle between the BJP and Congress, the performance of the latter was again utterly disappointing.
As far as the strategy of the Congress leadership is concerned, there are some contradictory viewpoints. It is said that the new generation leadership of the party led by Rahul Gandhi wants that the party should make an effort to regain the lost ground in the Hindi heartland region, as despite winning some seats in this region in 2004, the party’s vote share compared to the 1999 general election registered a sharp decline. Thus a section of party leadership believes that if coalition politics is taken for granted for the survival of the party in this crucial region for an indefinite time, the party has no future. Then it is something like a calculated risk taken by the Congress leadership to make its presence felt so that it can emerge as a formidable force in the Assembly elections in Bihar, UP and Jharkhand to form a non-BJP or non-BSP government. In fact, in the absence of any major emotive issue in UP, opposition parties in the State are mainly targeting the functioning of the ruling BSP government besides leaning on their respective caste equations to lure the voters. While the Congress tom-toms the performance of the UPA, it also wants to take the Mayawati government to task on law and order and rampant corruption. Undeterred by the criticism, the ruling BSP is circulating booklets to highlight its achievements and its broad-based strategy for the sarva samaj. The BSP plans to repeat its successful “social engineering” formula. But this may have some relevance in UP, but in case of Bihar and Jharkhand it will not be effective although in other States like MP, Chhattishgarh, HP and Uttarakhand, the Congress will have to fight on its own.
But in an election in which alliances are going to play a major role in determining the complexion of the next government, the decision of the leadership of 10 Janpath to go alone into the crucial battle of ballots in the Hindi-heartland does not seem realistic. In fact the electorate in this region has remained so divided on the lines of caste, religion and region during the last two decades that it has virtually made the Congress policy irrelevant. The prime cause of decline in the support base of the Congress Party in this region is that the leadership in New Delhi has failed to read the transitional phase of politics and the changing social order that has given birth to caste-based politics. It will be interesting to see how the party faces the acid test this time.
(The writer is a freelancer based in Halakura, Dhubri) THE SENTINEL
1 comment:
A good review.
Being not a ideology-party (such as the Communists or the BJP, in a way),it has to convince the voters in every region in this vast country, that the party is alive to its -the region's - problems and it is capable of thinking local, even though it is national in nature and stature. Encouraging local leaders would perhaps be the first step. Whatever the media-hype, there is an emerging class of people, who do not think in terms of caste or religion in casting the vote. It should show its distinction from others in selecting local leaders, without caste or religioous considerations. Ground level elections for its party management committees, rather than 'nomination' by "High Command" should start in right earnest.
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