End of nuclear apartheid

— Chintamani Mahapatra
After a hard diplomatic struggle, the Nuclear Suppliers Group reportedly gave a clean waiver to India to the full satisfaction of the Manmohan Singh Government. The opponents of the Indo-US civilian nuclear cooperation initiative, however, continued to find fault with the outcome of the NSG deliberations.

The main point of contention at Vienna among the NSG members was, of course, related to a possible nuclear test by India in the future. The group of six, consisting of Austria, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Ireland and Norway wanted strict conditionality in the waiver provisions to prevent any further nuclear test by India.

It was actually not easy for either India or the United States to convince these countries to give a clean waiver to India and accept the draft prepared by the US in consultation with India, Austria and Switzerland, for instance, are industrially developed countries which have traditionally followed a policy of neutrality even during the prolonged Cold War. They are not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation nor are they great economic partners of the United States.

The Netherlands is a NATO member, yet a promoter of strict non-proliferation and Amsterdam-decided to side with the minority of holdout countries opposing the US draft. Ireland is a close trade and investment partner of the United States. American investment in Ireland is more in dollar terms than India, China, Russia and Brazil combined. It was still not easy for the US to use its leverage until the last moment. Norway has minimal stake in India. It is not an energy starving nation and hardly realises the energy requirements of India.

New Zealand was the real tough nut to crack. It entered into a trilateral strategic alliance with Australia and the US in 1951. The Labour government in 1985 used its non-proliferation principle and demanded that the US ships passing through its territorial waters must declare the nuclear status. The US, as a matter of principle neither affirms nor denies information about its carrying nuclear weapons. New Zealand was prepared to lose the benefits of the ANZUS alliance rather than alter its non-proliferation policy. It has not returned to ANZUS until now.

There is little doubt that hard bargaining and skillful diplomacy by the US and the UPA Government’s cooperation brought out the consensus at Vienna. One of the important developments that impacted upon the deliberations was the leak of a letter written by the White House to the Congress in reply to a host of questions raised by the American legislators regarding the nuclear deal. A large number of questions were on the credibility of the 123 agreement in promoting nonproliferation. There were apprehensions that the nuclear deal with India would enhance India’s nuclear weapon capability.

The 26-page letter tried to convince the US legislators that the Presidency was committed to non-proliferation; that the 123 agreement with India would in no way increase India’s weapon capability; that US civilian nuclear cooperation would end in the eventuality of an Indian nuclear weapon test. Expectedly, when this letter was made open to public, Indian opponents of the nuclear deal raised a hue and cry. Their main argument being that the Prime Minister’s assurances to Parliament were negated by this letter.

Ironically, the same letter worked wonders at the 45-member NSG meet. It convinced many suspicious members that the Bush Administration was in no way rewarding India with sophisticated technology to improve its nuclear arsenals. It facilitated negotiations with the members by highlighting the non-proliferation and environmental aspects of the nuclear deal and the need to highlighting security clean energy.

Meanwhile, the Manmohan Singh government explained to its public that it was not bound the by content of a letter exchanged between the two branches of the US Government and reiterated that what mattered was the letter and the spirit of the 123 agreement. Around the same time, Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee issued a suo moto statement on the country’s nuclear policy aimed at the NSG member countries. He reiterated the no-first use of the nuclear weapon pledge. He also reemphasised the self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing. Moreover, Mukherjee stressed the export control mechanism put in place through appropriate legislations and also indicated that despite being a non-signatory to the NPT, India has had a robust non-proliferation record.

Clearly, these two developments had an impact on a large number of NSG members, but a few holdouts appeared headstrong. It was argued that the NSG waivers to India should have more explicit provisions to ensure against any future nuclear test by India; and that any nuclear explosion by India would automatically end nuclear cooperation of member countries with it.

Once the consensus was reached after top-level political interventions by Washington, there was expected unhappiness in certain quarters. What was not expected was yet another round of strong reactions against the nuclear deal by the opponents of the deal in India. In the end, the communists and the nationalists should have respected the majority support in Parliament to the deal. To the contrary, some of them continue to call it a sell-out. Others characterised it as surrender of national sovereignty. None other than the Government could point out that the NSG waiver spelled the end of nuclear apartheid against India after a span of more than three decades! – INFA